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ABSTRACT 
We quantified measles transmissibility during a measles outbreak in Ohio in 2014 to evaluate the impact 
of public health responses. Case incidence and the serial interval (time between symptom onset in 
primary and secondary cases) were used to assess trends in the effective reproduction number R 
(average number of secondary cases generated per case). A mathematical model was parameterized by 
early R values to determine outbreak size and duration if containment measures had not been initiated, 
and the impact of vaccination. As containment started, we found a fourfold decline in R (~4 to 1) over 2 
weeks, and maintenance of R<1 as control measures continued. Under a conservative scenario, the 
model estimated 8,472 cases (90% confidence interval [CI]: 8,447, 8,489) over 195 days (90% CI: 179, 
223) without control efforts, and 715 cases (90% CI: 103, 1,338) over 128 days (90% CI: 117, 139) 
when including vaccination; 7,757 fewer cases (90% CI: 7,130, 8,365) and 67 fewer outbreak days (90% 
CI: 48, 98) were attributed to vaccination. Vaccination may not account entirely for transmission 
reductions, suggesting changes in community behavior (social distancing) and other control efforts 
(isolation, quarantining) are important. Our findings highlight the benefits of measles outbreak response 
and of understanding behavior change dynamics. 
Keywords: Measles; outbreak response; transmissibility; reproduction number; United States 
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Measles is a highly contagious viral disease that can lead to serious complications and death. Even with 
repeated importations of measles into the United States, most introductions do not result in additional 
transmission, outbreaks are generally small (1), and endemic measles transmission has been declared 
eliminated since 2000 (2). The success of the U.S. measles elimination program is credited to high 
measles-mumps-rubella (MMR) vaccine coverage, as well as the rapid implementation of control 
measures once cases are reported (2). Yet, the relative contributions of baseline coverage and of various 
simultaneous control measures (vaccination, isolation, quarantine) in preventing large outbreaks is not 
fully understood (3). Because, outbreak responses by health agencies are labor intensive and costly (4), 
efforts to measure the effectiveness of these interventions are important. 
On March 2014, the return of two unvaccinated Amish men to Ohio from the Philippines, where they 
were unknowingly infected with measles, led to the largest outbreak of measles in the US in over two 
decades (5, 6). The outbreak provided an opportunity to measure the impact of public health responses 
in mitigating measles transmission in an under-immunized community. We aimed to quantify measles 
transmissibility during the outbreak, and to evaluate the effect of public health responses in limiting the 
size and duration of the outbreak. 
METHODS 
Transmissibility was measured by estimating the effective reproduction number, R, the average number 
of cases generated by a single infectious individual (7). The goal of outbreak response is to reduce R 
below the threshold value of 1; transmission wanes when R is maintained at <1, bringing an outbreak 
under control. Using a ready-to-use tool (8), R was estimated from case incidence time series data and 
the distribution of the serial interval (the time between the onset of symptoms in primary and secondary 
cases) (9). We tracked R over time during the outbreak and correlated changes in transmissibility to 
control efforts. Two distinct time-varying estimates of R were measured: the instantaneous reproduction 
number (Rt), and the case reproduction number (Rc) (8). Rt measures the expected transmissibility at 
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calendar time, t, based on the ratio of the number of new infections in that time step, to the total 
infectiousness of previous cases. Thus, Rt can be estimated in real-time, as new cases are identified.(8) 
Rc measures the actual transmissibility of cases with symptom onset at calendar time, t, and is calculated 
once all secondary cases are detected and thus it is retrospective (8, 10). To maintain precision, Rt and Rc 
were calculated for each day of the outbreak over a 14-day time window ending on that day.(8) Details 
of these methods are available elsewhere (8, 10). The estimation procedures were applied to outbreak 
notification data (incidence by the date of rash onset) using a serial interval for measles derived from 
household studies (gamma distribution with mean of 11.1 days and a standard deviation of 2.47 days) 
(9). 
To evaluate the probable size and duration of the outbreak if control measures had not been introduced, 
we simulated potential outbreak trajectories using a continuous time stochastic susceptible-exposed-
infectious-recovered compartmental model; stochastic variability was incorporated using the adaptive 
tau-leaping algorithm (11). The model tracks 4 classes of persons: 1) susceptible to infection and disease 
(S), 2) exposed but not yet infectious and asymptomatic (E), 3) infectious with symptoms (I), and 4) 
recovered and immune (R) (Figure 1). All persons in the S class can be infected at a rate λ(t), the force 
of infection, and move into the E class. Exposed individuals then become infectious, and progress from 
the E class into the I class at a rate σ. Finally, persons recover (i.e., become immune) and move from the 
I class into the R class at a rate γ.  
Static model inputs are detailed in Table 1. λ(t) is proportional to β, the per capita rate at which two 
individuals come into sufficient contact to lead to infection per unit time, and to the number of infectious 
individuals at time t (It). The rate β itself can be written as a combination of three parameters: the basic 
reproduction number R0 (the average number of cases generated by a single infectious individual if the 
entire population is susceptible), the duration of infectiousness, and the population size. R0 may vary 
considerably for the same disease in different populations (7). However, R0 in a particular population can 
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be estimated from R and the ≥1-dose MMR vaccine coverage (VC), as follows: R=sR0, where s is the 
proportion of the population that is susceptible,  
s=VC(1-VE)+sU(1-VC), 
where VE is the median vaccine effectiveness of 1 dose of MMR (93%) (12), and sU is the proportion of 
unvaccinated individuals that are susceptible (i.e., not immune through previous exposure), so that 
R0=R/[VC(1-VE)+sU(1-VC)]. 
Immunization levels in the Amish community were unknown. Thus, we modeled two distinct scenarios, 
using a lower and upper bound in VC. A lower bound in VC of 14% was derived from a coverage 
assessment in a subset of affected Amish families (62 households with measles cases selected by 
convenience sampling, totaling 451 individuals) (5); these data were obtained through review of 
vaccination cards and of the Ohio immunization registry (ImpactSIIS) (5). An upper bound in VC of 
68% was obtained from a recent study showing that this was proportion of Amish children in Holmes 
County, Ohio that were reported to have received ≥1 doses of any vaccine (13). The estimate of sU was 
based on a measles attack rate of 67.5% among 160 exposed unvaccinated family members, part of a 
household transmission study conducted during the outbreak. Lower and upper bounds in VC were then 
used to calculate the corresponding R0 and β parameters to model a range of possible scenarios. 
Reassuringly, our R0 estimates ranged between 7-16 (Table 1), consistent with prior estimates for 
measles in various settings (ranging between 5-18) (7). Of note, in any given population with a 
particular contact pattern, the transmissibility potential of measles would be described by a single R0 
value; the true R0 for this community is likely somewhere in between the range estimated. 
The σ and γ parameters are inversely proportional, respectively, to the pre-infectious period (the time 
period between infection and onset of infectiousness), and to the duration of infectiousness. 
We assumed random mixing and a finite population size of 32,630 persons – the estimated Amish 
population in the affected settlement during 2014 (14). Due to natural (and maternal) immunity, as well 
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as vaccine coverage prior to the outbreak, a proportion of the population was assumed to be recovered at 
the outset, bypassing the S class, although they were allowed make contacts and thus were accounted for 
in the calculation of the incidence. 
To assess the impact of the vaccination campaign, we queried ImpactSIIS for the number of doses of 
MMR given at local health departments in affected counties during the time vaccine clinics were offered 
(April 22-July 24, 2014). Unvaccinated individuals who received MMR were removed from the S class 
and added to the R class based on day of vaccine receipt; during broad vaccination campaigns, the 
vaccine may reach unvaccinated individuals before or around the time of exposure (5, 15), and when 
administered within 72 hours after exposure, MMR vaccine can protect or modify the clinical course of 
measles (12, 16).  
Five hundred iterations of the model were run for each of the two scenarios, in the absence and presence 
of the vaccination campaign. The median size and duration of predicted outbreak trajectories, and the 
corresponding daily changes in Rc, are presented and compared to what was observed. We modeled 
transmission in the affected Amish community only, without potential spill over to the general (non-
Amish) population, where immunity levels are high and almost no measles spread was seen (5). 
To evaluate the appropriateness of using early estimates of R to inform the susceptible-exposed-
infectious-recovered model, we compared the expected (as predicted by the model) and the observed 
number of cases during the first 29 days of the outbreak, prior to initiation of the control measures. 
Sensitivity analyses were conducted to examine (1) the choice of time window width used to estimate Rt, 
(2) the use of symptom onset instead of rash onset to estimate R, (3) the impact of advancing or delaying 
the vaccination campaign by 1 week (to evaluate delays in vaccine protection [immunologic response] 
and outbreak response), (4) a range of measles vaccine effectiveness (84.8% to 97.0%) at baseline (17), 
(5) a measles vaccine effectiveness of 90.5% for campaign doses (18), and (6) a shorter infectious period 
of 5 days (19). 
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Analyses were performed in R 3.2.3. 
Since the investigation was part of a public health response, it was not considered by the Centers for 
Disease and Control to be research, and was designated as exempt from human subject policy.  
RESULTS 
The outbreak affected one of the largest Amish communities in North America, located in the Holmes 
County, Ohio area (14). A total of 383 confirmed measles cases were reported over 121 days. Vigorous 
containment efforts were instituted by local health departments to limit measles spread, including the 
delivery of MMR doses to 8,726 unvaccinated individuals (5). 
The epidemic curve and the estimated Rt and Rc are shown in Figure 2. Rt increased from an initial value 
of 1.2 (90% confidence interval (CI): 0.4-2.8) at the end of the third week to a maximum value of 9.6 
(90% CI: 6.6-13.4) in the mid-fifth week, then varied between 3.1 and 4.6 from the mid-sixth week to 
the mid-seventh week. Thereafter, as the vaccination campaign started to get under way, estimates 
declined over two weeks, with Rt falling below 1 by the mid-ninth week. As the campaign continued, Rt 
remained below 1 during the next 2 months, except at the very end of the epidemic, when it increased 
from a minimum value of 0.16 (90% CI: 0.07-0.3) to 1.4 (90% CI: 0.7-2.5). This late increase in Rt 
occurred after introduction of measles into a single, unimmunized family consisting of six individuals, 
four of which developed measles. Similar patterns in transmissibility were observed with Rc, i.e., high 
initial values with variability, a steady decrease as control measures started, and maintenance below 1 
thereafter.  
The distribution of the expected number of cases (as determined by the model) during the first 29 days 
of the outbreak, prior to initiation of control measures, captured well the number of observed cases; the 
observed and projected daily case incidence tracked each other well in the early stages of the outbreak 
(Figure 3B), and the number of observed cases consistently fell between the 25
th
 and 50
th
 percentiles of 
the predicted data, for the range of scenarios that were evaluated. 
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The range of possible outbreak sizes and durations projected by the model are shown in Table 2. Under 
the first scenario, assuming an initial VC of 14%, the model estimated approximately 19,000 measles 
cases presenting over 215 days if no control efforts had been introduced, and approximately 9,500 
measles cases presenting over 260 days when including the vaccination campaign; the model attributes 
~9,500 fewer cases to vaccination efforts. Under the second scenario, assuming an initial VC of 68%, the 
model estimated approximately 8,500 measles cases presenting over 200 days if no control efforts had 
been introduced, and approximately 700 measles cases presenting over 130 days when including the 
vaccination campaign; ~7,700 fewer cases and 65 fewer outbreak days were attributed to vaccination 
efforts. 
Results based on anecdotal immunization levels in the community of 40-50% reported by local health 
departments, are presented in Figure 3. Assuming an initial VC of 45%, in the absence of containment 
measures, the model predicts an outbreak with a median of approximately 13,000 cases. When the 
vaccination campaign is included, the model predicts a smaller outbreak, with a median of 
approximately 3,400 cases (Figure 3A); 9,600 fewer cases are attributed to vaccination efforts. When 
comparing model predictions that include the vaccination campaign with what was observed (Figure 
3B), an excess ~3,000 cases were projected by the model, which may be accounted by other factors 
(e.g., changes in community behavior including social distancing, and other control efforts such as 
isolation and quarantining). 
A comparison of the changes in the observed and projected daily estimates of Rc are shown in Figure 4. 
The observed Rc trajectory (which represents the effect of the vaccination campaign, other control 
efforts, and changes in community behavior) indicated a rapid decline in measles transmissibility over 
time. By contrast, declines in transmissibility were slower from a depletion of susceptible individuals 
from infection plus the vaccination campaign (model with the vaccination campaign), and from a 
depletion of susceptible individuals from infection alone (model without the vaccination campaign). 
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Sensitivity analyses found that varying several of the assumptions in this evaluation resulted in little 
change on the overall patterns of measles transmissibility; these include the choice of time window used 
to estimate R (Web Figure 1), the use of daily counts of onset of symptoms (instead of onset of rash) to 
estimate R (Web Figure 2), an evaluation of a range of measles vaccine effectiveness at baseline (Web 
Table 1), an evaluation of the effect of vaccination assuming an effectiveness of 90.5% for campaign 
doses (Web Table 2), and an evaluation of delays in vaccine protection (immunologic response) and 
outbreak response (Web Table 3). 
DISCUSSION 
Through monitoring of measles communicability during this outbreak, we show that containment efforts 
likely contributed to reducing measles spread, and demonstrate that launching comprehensive and timely 
public health responses can help avert large outbreaks from occurring in under-immunized populations. 
These findings corroborate previous results of an individual-based model, also showing the potential of 
measles spread to other North American Amish communities in the absence of outbreak responses (6). 
As containment measures started to get underway, we found a ~4-fold reduction in transmissibility (Rt 
declined from 4.6 to 1) over 2 weeks, and subsequent maintenance of Rt below unity as control measures 
continued. Based on the observed epidemic curve, in the absence of vaccination or behavioral changes, 
cases could have continued to double approximately every 5 days in the early stages of the outbreak 
(Web Appendix), and assuming a conservative scenario (initial vaccination coverage of 68%), the 
number of affected individuals might have increased to ~8,400, i.e., >20 times the number of cases 
observed (383 cases). Outbreaks of this magnitude have not been seen in the US since elimination was 
declared.(1) Based on hospitalization rates for measles in this community (5), and post-elimination 
measles case-fatality ratios (20), such an outbreak could have resulted in ~275 hospitalizations and ~9 
deaths (12 hospitalizations and no deaths were reported during the outbreak). 
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Evidence supporting measles outbreak response immunization is increasing. A review of vaccination 
during outbreaks in middle- and low-income countries noted an impact in 16 (42%) of 38 papers (3), and 
updated WHO guidelines recommend this strategy in countries with measles mortality reduction goals 
(21). Fewer studies have evaluated the benefits of vaccination during outbreaks in elimination settings 
(5, 22-27), where background immunization coverage is high and outbreaks occur in under-vaccinated 
subpopulations. In such evaluations, it is often challenging to account for a depletion of susceptible 
persons from infection, or for other aspects related to outbreak control and community behavior –
isolation of cases, quarantining of susceptible contacts, and self-imposed social distancing, e.g., limited 
attendance to church gatherings or social events because of measles awareness. Our results suggest that 
the vaccination campaign could not have accounted entirely for the observed decrease in transmissibility 
(Figure 4). By immediately reducing the number of susceptible contacts each ill individual makes, these 
other factors seem to play an important role. Based on an initial coverage of ~45%, we show that ~3,000 
fewer cases might be attributed to community engagement and behavioral changes. Yet, any factor that 
affects the force of infection during an outbreak, including spatial and social heterogeneity in mixing, 
unevenness in MMR coverage, or varying effects of control interventions in different areas (e.g., 
targeting primarily those exposed), could also have curbed transmission. Data on each of the 
components of outbreak response (particularly isolation and quarantining) are needed to disentangle 
their relative effectiveness (28), and quantifying and modeling the dynamics of behavior change in 
response to epidemics is a particular challenge and priority. 
Our evaluation highlighted a few interesting aspects of measles transmissibility and outbreak control. 
First, considerable variability in transmission was evident early during the outbreak; estimates of Rc 
varied between 3.1 and 10.2 before interventions began. This variability may be an artifact of the 
estimation method resulting from an initial low number of incident cases (8), or a reflection of 
differences in the contact rates of the first several case-patients. The latter could be an observation bias –
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if the first few cases generate many other cases, the outbreak gets past the chance of initial extinction 
and can spread beyond the initial cluster. Second, cases continued to occur for ~2 months after R fell 
below 1, indicating that sustained transmission can occur when R is near unity, and that both elimination 
efforts and outbreak control measures should aim to reduce R as close to 0 as possible. A similar effect 
has been observed in a previous outbreak of influenza (29) and could be the effect of the interaction with 
the behavioral or public health response, where cases cause small clusters of secondary cases that are 
largely contained but might seed other sub-outbreaks elsewhere (30). Third, measures to control an 
exceedingly contagious disease like measles are likely more successful when the susceptible population 
is embedded in a general population with high MMR vaccine uptake. 
The measles containment strategies (16) implemented during this outbreak could serve as a guide on 
how to halt propagation of the disease in non-immunized subpopulations in elimination settings. In the 
Region of the Americas, for example, despite 1-dose measles vaccine coverage being maintained at 
≥90% since 1998 (31), and a declaration of measles elimination in 2016 (32), recent outbreaks reported 
in Ecuador, Canada (33), the US (1, 34), and Brazil (35), indicate that coverage is not homogenous. 
These outbreaks ranged considerably in size and duration (147 to 1,065 confirmed measles cases, 9 
weeks to 1.5 years long), and were characterized by varying containment efforts. In the US, reports of 
measles cases are expected within 24 hours of confirmation (16), triggering the implementation of 
enhanced surveillance, and of measures to limit spread. Key elements to curtail transmission include 
isolation of cases until no longer infectious, vaccination of susceptible contacts, and quarantining of 
susceptible contacts who cannot be vaccinated (16). 
Our analysis has several limitations. First, often all causes of heterogeneity cannot be accounted for in 
models. Measles was reported in nine Ohio counties (5), and homogenous mixing does not account for 
more complex spatial patterns of spread in this community, or for preferential mixing by age. However, 
at least part of the heterogeneity in contact rates is captured by the initial R values, which we then use to 
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get the projected model estimates. Similarly, any underlying heterogeneity in immunity was unknown, 
yet, a broad range of coverage scenarios were modeled, and an impact of controls measures was evident 
under a conservative scenario. Of note, the model also assumes a homogenous effect of vaccination 
efforts, which may underestimate their impact. In addition, final outbreak sizes and the impact of the 
interventions depend on the estimated population at risk, and we did not measure the impact of the 
response in limiting spread to other Amish communities, including outside Ohio (6). Because of these 
caveats, the trajectories we present should not be viewed as exact projections, but characterize probable 
trends in transmissibility and in the potential for control. Second, case under-ascertainment might have 
occurred, however, enhanced surveillance, widespread knowledge of the outbreak, and established 
relationships with the community likely improved case identification (5). Importantly, estimates of R 
would not be affected as long as surveillance does not change considerably during the outbreak (8, 10), 
and sudden decreases or increases in case reporting were unlikely. Third, we chose an infectious period 
of 9 days based on outbreak control guidelines (16, 36, 37), which may be closer to maximum duration 
of infectiousness, and long for models assuming this period is the mean of an exponential distribution. 
However, the number of cases prevented by vaccination using a shorter infectious period (19) was still 
significant, and our base model tracked the initial outbreak trajectory better (Web Table 4). Fourth, we 
did not account for imperfect or delayed vaccine protection from campaign doses. However, sensitivity 
analyses using a lower effectiveness (18), and delaying vaccine protection by 1 week, did not have a 
substantial impact on our findings. Finally, this is an evaluation of a single outbreak and our findings 
may not be generalizable to all communities where importations occur, and the assumption of 
homogenous mixing may not be applicable to other measles outbreaks in post-elimination settings. 
The findings in this report demonstrate the substantial public health impact of rapid measles containment 
efforts in an unvaccinated community in an elimination setting. Our results reinforce WHO’s measles 
elimination strategy, that includes outbreak preparedness as one of the core components to achieve 
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elimination targets in 5 of the 6 WHO regions by 2020 (21). Measles elimination is a fragile state (38) 
and the data provided here may serve as an impetus for local and international health organizations to 
allocate resources to build and maintain capacity for measles outbreak readiness, including in countries 
where measles incidence is sufficiently low or elimination has been achieved. The single best means of 
measles containment, however, is maintaining high initial levels of vaccination coverage across the 
population. 
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Figure 1. Schematic representation of disease states, flow between states, and parameters controlling 
flow in the measles model. The model represents a constant (closed) population in which individuals are 
either susceptible (S) or recovered (R) to measles infection and disease, and into which a measles 
introduction occurs (i.e., a number of infectious individuals (I) is introduced). Persons in the susceptible 
pool become exposed at the force of infection λ(t), and then progress through the exposed pre-infectious 
(E) and the infectious (I) stages, before arriving in the removed compartment (R), where individuals are 
immune. The symbols σ and γ denote the rates at which individuals progress into the I and R 
compartments, respectively. The model tracks, each day, the number of individuals in each of the 
compartments, and incorporates stochasticity using the adaptive tau-leaping algorithm.(11) The effect of 
the vaccination campaign is represented by θ, the number of unvaccinated individuals who received a 
dose of MMR during containment efforts. Unvaccinated individuals are removed from the S 
compartment and added to R compartment (bypassing E and I) based on the day MMR was 
administered. 
 
Figure 2. A) The daily epidemiologic curve; the daily total numbers of confirmed outbreak-associated 
measles case-patients in Ohio in 2014 according to day of rash onset are shown (N=383); for three case-
patients, the rash onset date could not be determined, and the illness onset date +2 days (the median 
number of days between illness onset and rash for all other cases) is shown; one lab-confirmed case-
patient did not develop rash and the date of illness onset is shown. B) Daily estimates of the 
instantaneous reproduction number Rt over sliding 14-day windows; the black line shows the median 
estimate, the gray areas the 90% confidence intervals, and the horizontal dashed line the threshold value 
Rt=1; C) Daily estimates of the case reproduction number (Rc) over sliding 14-day windows; the red 
circle shows the mean estimate, the bars the 90% confidence intervals, and the horizontal dashed line the 
threshold value Rc=1. As expected, estimates of Rc were ahead of the estimates of Rt, with the highest 
estimate of Rc occurring around the end of the third week, about one serial interval (11-12 days) before 
the peak in Rt; the peak in Rt in the mid-fifth week indicates increased transmissibility among cases with 
rash onset one generation before.(8) Superimposed in all figures is the cumulative number of daily doses 
of MMR vaccine given at local health department vaccination clinics during the outbreak. 
 
Figure 3. Projected and observed daily measles case incidence assuming an initial vaccination coverage 
of 45%. One hundred iterations of the modeled epidemic curves are presented; dashed lines show the 
median daily measles case incidence of all iterations. Panel A compares model trajectories with and 
without the vaccination campaign. Panel B compares the model trajectories including the vaccination 
campaign to the observed epidemic curve (that included other control measures). Note that the scale of 
the axes differ. Cumulative case incidence was as follows: model without vaccination, 12,946 (90% 
confidence interval [CI] 12,919, 12,968) cases over 207 (90% CI: 187, 233) days; model with 
vaccination campaign, 3,353 (90% CI: 2,551, 4,003) cases over 247 (90% CI: 183, 370); observed with 
control interventions, 383 cases over 121 days. 
Figure 4. Panel A shows the observed and projected daily estimates of the case reproduction number 
(Rc) over sliding 14-day windows; the black and blue circles show the median Rc of 100 model 
trajectories without and with the vaccination campaign, respectively, assuming an initial vaccination 
coverage of 45%. The red circles show the observed mean Rc estimate (that included other control 
measures, changes in community behavior), the red bars represent the 90% confidence intervals, and the 
horizontal dashed line indicates the threshold value Rc=1. Observed and projected Rc estimates were 
derived from the likelihood-based estimation procedure and directly from the models, respectively. 
Panel B shows the proportion of decline in Rc attributable to changes in community behavior (social 
distancing) and other control efforts (isolation, quarantining) during the outbreak; data presented are 
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from the initiation of containment efforts, to the time when projected estimates of Rc fall below 1. The 
reduction in transmissibility that may be ascribed to these factors varied between ~30-90% during the 
outbreak. 
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Table 1. Fixed input parameters for each model scenario 
Parameter Symbol Formula Value References 
Transmission 
probability 
β R0/ND 
Scenario 1
a
: 
2.74*10
−5
 per 
day 
NA 
Transmission 
probability 
β R0/ND 
Scenario 2
b
: 
6.12*10
−5
 per 
day 
NA 
Basic reproduction 
number 
R0 R/s 
Scenario 1: 
7.14 
NA 
Basic reproduction 
number 
R0 R/s 
Scenario 2: 
16.0 
NA 
R of cases prior to 
initiation of control 
measures 
R NA 4.22 
Estimates likelihood-based 
estimation procedure(8, 10) 
Proportion of the 
population that is 
susceptible at outset 
s 
VC (1−VE
c
)+sU
d
 
(1−VC) 
Scenario 1: 
0.59 
NA 
Proportion of the 
population that is 
susceptible at outset 
s 
VC (1−VE
c
)+sU
d 
(1−VC) 
Scenario 2: 
0.26 
NA 
Population size N S + E + I + R 32,630 
Young Center for Anabaptist 
and Pietist Studies, 
Elizabethtown College(14) 
Average pre-
infectious or latent 
period 
NA NA 10 days 
CDC measles surveillance 
manual and ACIP 
recommendations(12, 16) 
Average duration of 
infectiousness 
D NA 9 days 
CDC measles surveillance 
manual and ACIP 
recommendations(12, 16) 
Rate at which 
individuals become 
infectious 
σ 
1/average pre-
infectious or latent 
period 
0.1 per day NA 
Recovery rate γ 
1/average duration 
of infectiousness 
0.111 per day NA 
NA, not applicable; VC, ≥1-dose MMR coverage; VE, median vaccine effectiveness of 1 dose of MMR; 
sU, proportion of unvaccinated individuals that are susceptible; CDC, Centers for Disease Control and 
Prevention; ACIP, Advisory Committee on Immunization Practices 
aAssuming ≥1-dose MMR coverage of 14% to calculate s (lower bound) – from a coverage assessment 
in a subset of affected Amish families(5) 
bAssuming ≥1-dose MMR coverage of 68% to calculate s (upper bound) –from the literature(13) 
c
VE=93%(12) 
d
unvax.S=67.5% – from household transmission study 
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Table 2. Model Predictions of Measles Outbreak Sizes and Durations in an Amish Community in Ohio 
in 2014, With and Without the Vaccination Campaign
a
, and Based on Two Initial Levels (Lower and 
Upper Bounds) of MMR Coverage Prior to Initiation of Containment Efforts 
 
Assumed 
MMR 
coverage
b
 
No. of measles case-patients Duration of outbreak (days) 
Absolute Reduction Vaccination campaign included 
No Yes No Yes 
No. 90% CI No. 90% CI 
Duration 
(days) 
90% 
CI 
Duration 
(days) 
90% 
CI 
No. 
90% CI Duration 
(days) 
90% 
CI 
 
14% (lower) 
18,978 
18,944, 
19,003 
9,430 
9,109, 
9,844 
213 
195, 
241 
257 
201, 
308 
9,548  
9,128, 
9,866 
−44 
−95, 
22 
 
68% (upper) 
8,472 
8,447, 
8,489 
715 
103, 
1,338 
195 
179, 
223 
128 
117, 
139 
7,757 
7,130, 
8,365 
67 
48, 
98 
 
a
County health department clinics offering vaccination were held from day 30 to day 123 of the 
outbreak; first doses of MMR were delivered to 8,726 unvaccinated individuals 
b≥1-dose MMR coverage 
c
Values are the medians and 90% confidence intervals (CI) generated from 500 model simulations 
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